Abstract Often the S-boxes are the only nonlinear components in a block cipher and as such play an important role in ensuring its resistance to cryptanalysis. Cryptographic properties and constructions of S-boxes have been studied for many years. The most common techniques for constructing S-boxes are: algebraic constructions, pseudo-random generation and a variety of heuristic approaches. Among the latter are the genetic algorithms. In this paper, a genetic algorithm working in a reversed way is proposed. Using the algorithm we can rapidly and repeatedly generate a large number of strong bijective S-boxes of each dimension from (8 × 8) to (16 × 16), which have sub-optimal properties close to the ones of S-boxes based on finite field inversion, but have more complex algebraic structure and possess no linear redundancy.
Introduction
Most of the modern block ciphers have one or more non-linear components providing the effect of confusion [33] , which is of vital importance for the strength of the cipher. The most often used non-linear components are n to m Boolean mappings, called S-boxes. Among them, the bijective S-boxes are particularly interesting. Block ciphers have to be resistant to linear and differential cryptanalysis [3, 4, 19] . It is well known that the weight of a differential trail is equal to or larger than the product of the number of active S-boxes and the minimum (differential) weight per S-box (analogous for the linear trails). There are two known approaches for eliminating the low-weight trails -either by increasing the number of active S-boxes or by choosing stronger S-boxes. The number of active S-boxes can be increased by designing stronger linear layer, e.g., by using the wide trail strategy [11] . Larger S-boxes can be stronger since the minimum differential weight of an S-box is limited by its size. In this paper we only focus on the second approach. In order to be suitable for use in cryptographic applications, S-boxes should possess high nonlinearity as well as low autocorrelation and low differential uniformity. In addition, cryptographically strong Sboxes should also satisfy cryptographic criteria, such as: regularity (balancedness) and high algebraic degree, as well as they should possess as few fixed points and linear redundancy as possible.
Motivation
Large S-boxes can fast improve the security (in the black box model) of a block cipher. In addition, the results in [18] indicate that the resistance to side-channel analysis could also be improved by increasing the size of the S-box. However, finding or constructing big (i.e. dimensions greater than 8) and cryptographically strong S-boxes is still an open problem.
The approaches available in the literature for S-box generation could be divided into three main streams: algebraic constructions, pseudo-random generation and heuristic techniques. The first approach is based on S-box generation according to mathematical principles. For example, the S-box of AES [11] is constructed by inverse mapping followed by an affine transformation in the finite field. Except for the case n = 6, where an S-box with δ = 2 was found [5] , S-boxes based on inversion in the finite field G F(2 n ) (n is even) are known to achieve the best values found for the nonlinearity and differential uniformity (N inv = 2 n−1 −2 n 2 and δ inv = 4 respectively, [26] ). Although these values are not the optimal values theoretically possible (N opt = 2 n−1 − 2 n 2 −1 and δ opt = 2, [25] ) and filling up the gap between them and their known theoretical bounds is an open problem in cryptography, it is believed that the finite field inversion-based S-boxes are the optimal ones that exist with respect to the simultaneous satisfaction of all targeted cryptographic criteria. In [36] (8 × 8) bijective S-boxes with nonlinearity 110 and differential uniformity 4 and with nonlinearity 112 and differential uniformity 6 were found. A new method for constructing 4-uniform permutations has recently been proposed in [28, 29] .
The second approach is based on using some pseudo-random generation. However, to find good S-boxes quickly becomes infeasible as the size of the input space increases. Also, the probability of finding really strong S-boxes is very small. For example, in the case of (8 × 8) S-boxes, the highest value for nonlinearity found is 98 − 100 [22, 23] , which is rather low compared to the value of 112 for the finite field inversion-based case.
The third approach uses heuristic algorithms in a process of iteratively improving given S-box or S-boxes with respect to one or more properties. Because these algorithms use direct search methods, unlike the algebraic constructions they are able to produce a large number of S-boxes, which are not optimal but sub-optimal. Specific heuristic techniques include hill climbing method, simulated annealing method, genetic algorithm or a combination of these. For example, the highest nonlinearity achieved by: the hill climbing method is 100 [22] , the simulated annealing method is 102 [9] , and by a special genetic algorithm is 104 [34] . Gradient descent method has been used recently in [16] . In [17] , values of 104 have been achieved for the nonlinearity by a method, referred as the modified gradient descent, which is based on swapping a number of values in a permutation.
The construction of a large number of good bijective S-boxes quickly becomes a hard job as their size increases. As the number of input variables n increases by one, the number of Boolean functions in the space increases by a factor of 2 2 n . That is why, except for the algebraic construction method, the other two methods fail short already when n = 8. Therefore, it is a challenge to improve the results for size 8, and even more, to go for larger S-boxes.
Contribution
Often it is desired (e.g. for efficient implementations) to find a large set of strong bijective S-boxes possessing the same cryptographic properties and to allow the designer to freely choose the S-box within this set to be used in a cryptographic algorithm. Unfortunately, by using algebraic constructions it is not possible to find a big set of strong S-boxes. Pseudorandom generation methods either will result in not strong enough S-boxes or it will not be possible to find many of them. What concerns the known heuristic techniques, the conventional approach from bottom to the top, where usually one starts with some initial set of random S-boxes and tries iteratively to improve them, is not quite suitable. The obtained in this way set of values corresponding to the set of targeting criteria is not close enough to the set of values of finite field inversion-based S-boxes. Therefore, in this paper we propose a new method to generate a big set of strong S-boxes based on a genetic algorithm which is working in a "reversed" way. More precisely, the algorithm starts from an initial pool of S-boxes based on inversion in the finite field and searches for S-boxes which are close to them with respect to the targeted set of cryptographic criteria. The detailed description is provided in Section 4. Applying the new algorithm we repeatedly and rapidly obtain a large set of S-boxes which are:
1. of dimensions from (8 × 8) to (16 × 16); 2. have properties close to the best properties found of S-boxes based on finite field inversion; 3. have more complex algebraic structure; 4. possess little or no linear redundancy. 1 For the case of (8 × 8) bijective S-boxes the algorithm outputs thousands of S-boxes with nonlinearities 106, 108, 110 and 112 = N inv in 2 days work on a cluster with 32 cores. For example, between 4000-5000 different S-boxes corresponding to the distinct nonlinearity values. Except for those S-boxes reported in [36] , neither S-boxes with nonlinearity 110 and zero linear redundancy, nor such with nonlinearity 112 possessing incomplete redundancy were reported so far in the literature. For the sake of comparison we have checked the S-boxes reported in [36] against our target set of criteria.
For the case of (16 × 16) bijective S-boxes 50 S-boxes with values of nonlinearity 32400 = N inv − 112 are obtained (N inv = 2 n−1 − 2 n 2 = 32512) after 3 months work on the same computer. With nonlinearities closer to N inv , for example N S = N inv − 36 = 32476, 50 S-boxes are obtained for less than a month. In fact, thanks to the "reversed" way the 1 "m of 255" in Table 1 means that m out of 255 S-box component Boolean functions belong to distinct extended affine equivalence classes algorithm works, it can output S-boxes with each possible value of nonlinearity up to N inv . Furthermore, the closer to N inv the values of the nonlinearity are, the faster the algorithm works. We are not aware of any constructions of S-boxes with size larger than 8, obtained with either pseudo-random generation or heuristic techniques. Thus, it is the first time when such large S-boxes with good cryptographic properties are generated. In Table 1 we compare our results with the state of the art results for the case n = 8. Note that algebraic immunity is also included in the target set of criteria for the Gradient descent method. The reported value for algebraic immunity is 3 [17] . However, we do not include algebraic immunity in our target set of criteria, instead we consider linear redundancy.
Preliminaries
In this section we will briefly recall some of the basic definitions and properties of Boolean functions. For a comprehensive survey on Boolean functions we refer to [6, 7] .
Let the substitution table (S-box) of an n-binary input into m-binary output mapping be denoted by S. Then S : B n → B m and to each x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ B n some y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m ) ∈ B m is assigned by S(x) = y, where B = {0, 1} is the 1-dimensional Boolean space. Clearly, S can be considered as a vectorial Boolean function consisting of m individual Boolean functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f m , where f i : B n → B and f i (x) = y i for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. These functions are called coordinate Boolean functions of the S-box S and it is well known that most of the desirable cryptographic properties of S can be defined in terms of their linear combinations. S-box coordinate Boolean functions and all their linear combinations are referred as the S-box component Boolean functions.
Boolean functions
A Boolean function can be represented by a truth table, which is the binary output vector of the function containing 2 n elements. We obtain the polarity truth table when instead of f (x), the signed function f (x) = (−1) f (x) is considered. Another way of representing a Boolean function is by means of its algebraic normal form (AN F):
where the coefficients a I ∈ B, I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The algebraic degree of an n-variable Boolean function f (x), denoted by deg( f ), is the number of variables of the largest product term of the function's AN F having a non-zero coefficient.
Two n-variable Boolean functions f (x) and g(x) belong to the same extended affine equivalence class (or are extended affine equivalent) if and only if there exist some invertible (n × n) binary matrix A, vectors b, c ∈ B n and a scalar d ∈ B, such that g(
are said to be affine equivalent (or to belong to the same affine equivalence class)
The Walsh-Hadamard transform (W H T ) of an n-variable Boolean function f (x), denoted by F f (w), is defined by:
where l w (x) is the signed function of the linear function
is called a spectral Walsh coefficient and the real-valued vector of all 2 n Walsh coefficients is referred to as the WHT Spectrum. We denote the maximum absolute value taken by the WHT by
Some of the most important cryptographic properties that a Boolean function should possess are defined below. An n-variable Boolean function f (x) is called balanced if w H ( f ) = 2 n−1 , where by w H ( f ) is denoted the Hamming weight of f . The nonlinearity of an n-variable Boolean function f (x), denoted by N f , is the minimum distance to the set of all n-variable affine Boolean functions A(n). It is given by
, denoted by r f (α), taken with respect to a vector α ∈ B n is defined by:
is called spectral autocorrelation coefficient and the real-valued vector of all 2 n autocorrelation coefficients representing the ACT of the function is referred to as its ACT Spectrum.
The maximum ACT value or absolute indicator of an n-variable Boolean function in polarity form f (x), denoted by AC max ( f ), is defined by:
The results of Meier and Staffelbach [21] and of Preneel [27] show that some of the most important cryptographic characteristics of Boolean functions, such as algebraic degree, nonlinearity and absolute indicator, are invariant under (extended) affine transformations, while in other, like WHT and ACT, the effect produced by applying (extended) affine transformations is permutation in the values of the spectral coefficients, and some change in their signs. Anyway, their magnitudes are not affected by (extended) affine transformations. In other words, for any two extended affine equivalent n-variable Boolean functions f and g, is true that
Vectorial Boolean functions
The properties of Boolean functions discussed in the previous section can be extended to the case of vectorial Boolean functions (S-boxes). There are some conceptual similarities in the transition from the single-output to the multi-output case but there are also some essential differences in the manner by which the S-boxes properties are derived. It is important to note that it is not sufficient only to consider the coordinate Boolean function properties when considering S-box cryptographic properties but also their linear combinations.
To avoid trivial statistical attacks, a good S-box should be a regular (balanced) mapping. An (n × m) S-box S with n ≥ m is said to be regular if for each output y ∈ B m there are exactly 2 n−m inputs that are mapped to y. If the S-box is not regular, some outputs appear more often than others when the input to the S-box is randomly chosen and the bias can be exploited by the cryptanalyst. An (n × m) S-box with n ≥ m is regular if and only if all of its non-zero component Boolean functions are balanced [32] .
Linear cryptanalysis [19] is a known-plaintext attack which is trying to approximate the relationship between plaintext, ciphertext and the key bits by constructing a linear expression and then evaluating the probability P attached to this expression. Among all possible expressions, those which achieve highest/lowest probabilities to be the correct are the best linear/affine approximations. Thus, if all the probabilities P are approximately equal to 1 2 , the cipher will be resistant to linear and affine approximation.
An (n × m) S-box improves the immunity against linear cryptanalysis if in its linear approximation table (LAT) all the entries magnitudes are as small as possible. In [31] it is shown that the latter is equivalent to the statement that the nonlinearity of each non-zero S-box component Boolean function should be as high as possible. The nonlinearity of an (n × m) S-box S, denoted by N S , is defined as the minimum nonlinearity of each of the component Boolean functions excluding the zero one. It can be expressed as:
In order to resist low order approximation attacks each S-box must have an algebraic degree as high as possible [15, 24] . The (minimal) algebraic degree of an (n × m) S-box S, denoted by deg(S), is defined as the minimum algebraic degree of each of its non-trivial component Boolean functions. It can be expressed as follows:
Differential cryptanalysis, introduced by Biham and Shamir [3] , is applied to block ciphers as a chosen-plaintext attack, which consists in finding relationships between plaintext differences and their corresponding ciphertext differences in order to gain knowledge of the key bits. The differential uniformity of an (n × m) S-box S with n ≥ m, denoted by δ, is defined as the largest value present in its difference distribution table (DDT) not counting the first entry in the first row. That is, δ = max α∈B n \{0} max β∈B m |{x ∈ B n |S(x)⊕S(x ⊕α) = β}|. Then, S is said to be differentially δ-uniform.
Thus, a necessary condition for an S-box to improve the resistance against differential cryptanalysis is its DDT not to contain entries with large values (DDT to be flat) or equivalently the differential uniformity δ to be as small as possible [1, 8, 12] . In [37] [20] and AC(S) is the (2 n × 2 m ) autocorrelation matrix of S which columns represent the autocorrelation functions of all component Boolean functions of S. Also, in [37] a lower bound on the differential uniformity δ of S is given, involving the maximum absolute value in AC(S): δ ≥ 2 n−m + 2 −m AC(S) max , where by AC(S) max it is denoted the maximum absolute indicator among the absolute indicators of all non-trivial component Boolean functions of S. That is,
If AC(S) max is 0, which is known to be achieved by the perfect nonlinear (bent) functions [21, 30] , then δ will have the minimum value possible. Thus, small value of δ implies a small value for AC(S) max and hence, minimizing the overall autocorrelation of S-boxes, in terms of their AC(S) max , will help in providing resistance to differential cryptanalysis. Considering that δ is always even, then in the case of bijective S-boxes (n = m) can be concluded that the smallest possible value of δ is 2. However, in [3, 4] it is pointed out that the condition of the D DT of an S-box being flat is not sufficient for the S-box to resist differential cryptanalysis. In addition, the D DT should also contain as less non-zero entries as possible in its first column. In the case of bijective S-boxes this additional requirement is always fulfilled as the first column of the D DT contains only zeros except for the first entry. Taking into consideration the mentioned cryptographic properties of S-boxes and the properties of the coordinate Boolean functions and their linear combinations, we decided to target the following set of cryptographic criteria for a good bijective S-box S: We add Criterion 5 to the targeting set of cryptographic criteria as pointed out in [11] , although we are not aware of any cryptanalytic attack in the literature which takes advantage of the existence of fixed points in S-boxes.
In [13] , Fuller and Millan proposed a new criterion to be added to the above set, the "non-possession of linear redundancy", which is defined bellow. We add it to the targeted set as the Criterion 6. 
When all component Boolean functions of S (not counting the zero linear combination) are extended affine equivalent, S will possess complete linear redundancy. On the contrary, when no two extended affine equivalent non-zero linear combinations of the coordinate Boolean functions exists, S will possess zero linear redundancy. Small S-boxes will always have linear redundancy because of the few available extended affine equivalence classes for smaller n. However, for larger S-boxes, as the number of extended affine equivalence classes becomes quickly infeasible, the presence of linear redundancy is claimed to be an indicator for non-randomness and thus a potential source of new cryptanalysis [13] .
When optimizing Boolean functions for several cryptographic criteria simultaneously it is known that trade-offs exist. For example, the perfect nonlinear (bent) functions, which are known to achieve the highest possible value for nonlinearity 2 n−1 − 2 n−2 2 and the lowest δ-uniformity of 2, exist only for even n, but they are never balanced and always have small algebraic degree (≤ 
Generation methods
The available in the literature techniques for S-box generation could be divided into three main classes: algebraic constructions, pseudo-random generation and heuristic techniques.
Algebraic constructions
This approach is based on S-box generation according to certain mathematical principles. The algebraic constructions used rely either on proven mathematical relations or on the construction of bigger S-boxes from smaller ones [14] . Among the first are the finite field inversion mappings, the power mappings, etc. This is the most popular approach, because S-boxes generated in such a way are known to optimize all the desired criteria. The finite field operation of inversion has been shown to achieve the best known combination of high algebraic degree, high nonlinearity and low autocorrelation [26] . For example, an (8 × 8) S-box constructed in such a way will possess algebraic degree of 7, nonlinearity of 112, δ-uniformity of 4, and maximum non-zero autocorrelation of 32. The S-box of AES [11] is constructed with an inverse mapping followed by an affine transformation in the finite field. It is shown that certain algorithmic S-boxes possess complete linear redundancy and as such all component Boolean functions, except the zero one, are of the same extended affine equivalence class [2, 35] . The affine equivalence class of the finite field inversion for the (8 × 8) case is described in Table 2 .
In [36] a method exchanging (or "swapping") two values of a function has been used to produce strong S-boxes derived from the finite field inversion. Besides the simple algebraic structure of S-boxes obtained by algebraic constructions and the potential vulnerability to the algebraic attack [10] , these techniques are not typically designed to produce a large set of S-boxes.
Pseudo-random generation
The second approach is based on using some pseudo-random generation or a table of random numbers to generate the entries in the S-box and then test the S-box whether is good or not. Using this approach will take a great effort to find a good S-box because of the tradeoffs between desired criteria and the small number of good S-boxes among all in the whole (16, 34) , (20, 24) , (24, 36) , (28, 16) , (32, 5)} space, which quickly becomes infeasible as the size of the input space increases. For example, in the case of (8 × 8) S-boxes, the highest value for nonlinearity found is 98 − 100 [22, 23] , and these with nonlinearity 100 found were only four out of 50 million S-boxes generated.
Heuristic techniques
Heuristic techniques involve a process of iteratively improving given S-box(es) with respect to one or more properties. Unlike the algebraic constructions and due to the direct search methods they use, heuristic techniques are able to produce a large number of not optimal but sub-optimal S-boxes that often ensure better resistance against algebraic attacks and not the least make people believe in the absence of trapdoors. Specific heuristic techniques include: hill climbing method, simulated annealing method, genetic algorithm or a combination of these. Hill climbing method involves the application of small modifications of one or more distinct elements in order iteratively to improve one or more cryptographic properties. The highest nonlinearity achieved by this method is 100 [22] . Simulated annealing method provides an extension to the hill climbing technique in which the search process is able to move out of a local optimum in order to continue. For the case of (8 × 8) Sboxes by using this method S-boxes possessing nonlinearity 102 are generated [9] . Genetic algorithms work with a population of candidate solutions. Aiming to produce future populations of S-boxes possessing desired properties, they apply three operations inspired by natural evolution -selection, crossover and mutation. During the selection process parental pairs, selected from an initial solution pool, interbreed to produce children. The breeding scheme is based on the mechanism of crossover like in sexual reproduction. Genetic variation is result of breaking and recombining of parent genes, thus producing offspring with combined parents attributes. The crossover mechanism operates on parent genes selected by a crossover point which is chosen randomly. Everything before this point is copied from the first parent and then everything after this point is copied from the other. After the breeding of all parental pairs when all the children are born, a mutation is applied on them with the intention of producing random changes in the offspring and thus preventing from falling into a local optimum. Then a fitness function to each of the children is applied. Based on the fitness values obtained and the solutions in the current pool, a decision which of the children and which of the solutions in the current pool will replace the candidate solutions in the parent pool is made. After that a new evolutionary process begins and so on until reaching some chosen in advance threshold number of iterations. At the end, the fittest solution of the final generation is the best solution. Some (8 × 8) bijective S-boxes, having nonlinearity 104, are produced in [34] by combining a special genetic algorithm and total tree searching. Based on the gradient ascension method [16] , a method, referred to as the modified gradient descent method, is used for producing bijective S-boxes in [17] . By randomly swapping a number of values of a permutation, the method's efforts are directed towards S-boxes, possessing high nonlinearity, high algebraic degree, low differential uniformity and high algebraic immunity. In the case of (8 × 8) bijective S-boxes, the optimal with respect to the described targeted set of criteria S-box, produced by the method, possesses nonlinearity 104, algebraic degree 7, differential uniformity 8 and algebraic immunity 3. However, those results are probably not the limit for the mentioned method. It shows only the limit when the algebraic immunity is included as criteria.
New method
The proposed new method is based on a genetic algorithm working in a reversed way. The basic idea is to start from an initial pool of S-boxes based on a finite field inversion with respect to a polynomial basis and go down from their cryptographic characteristics optimal values until reaching some close to the optimal and chosen in advance threshold values, which are still satisfactory. The main goal of the algorithm is to provide a big set a) containing variety of big (from (8 × 8) up to (16 × 16)) bijective S-boxes; b) which possess cryptographic properties close to optimal ones; c) but which have more complex algebraic structure and possess zero linear redundancy; d) and all this with a reasonable execution time. We propose 3 algorithms. In the first two algorithms there is one fitness function, which checks whether the S-box nonlinearity is greater than the nonlinearity N inv of S-boxes based on inversion in the finite field. In the third algorithm we add a second fitness function, which also checks the S-box differential uniformity.
Genetic Algorithm 1
Genetic algorithm 1 (GA1) works in a reversed way, i.e, we start from S-boxes achieving the optimal known values for nonlinearity, algebraic degree and δ-uniformity. The input of the algorithm is an initial parent pool which contains T S-boxes of dimensions (n × n). Some of the S-boxes in the initial pool are based on finite field inversion with respect to a polynomial basis and the others are results from applying affine transformations to the finite field inversion S-boxes. The algorithm makes use of three main functions:
1. The breeding function, denoted by breeding(P i , P j , CoP 1 , CoP 2 ), has four arguments: two distinct parents from the parent pool -P i and P j ; and two distinct crossover points -CoP 1 and CoP 2 , which are randomly generated integers in the range (1, 2 n ) , pointing out the positions where the breaking of the genes of P i and P j , respectively is done. As an output, the breeding function returns the pair of children (Ch 1 , Ch 2 ). The children are obtained by the following crossover scheme: All T bijective S-boxes P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P T in the parental pool are represented by their look-up tables (LUTs). Thus, as a result of the breeding of the parental pair (P i , P j ), one of all T(T-1)/2 pairs (P 1 , P 2 ), (P 1 , P 3 ) , . . ., (P 1 , P T ), (P 2 , P 3 ), (P 2 , P 4 ), . . ., (P 2 , P T ), . . . , (P T 1 , P T ) possible, the pair of children (Ch 1 , Ch 2 ) is obtained by the rule:
, where x k ∈ B and k = 1, 2, . . . , CoP 1 ; Table 3 . 2. The mutation function, denoted by modeling(Ch), has as an input argument any child born as a result of the breeding of any of the parental pairs. The function is applied with two main purposes. First, to deal with unwanted mutation which may have occurred in the children after the crossover, namely the loss of their bijective property. So, the bijection must be repaired. Second, to add some additional randomness to the computational process, which will help in providing a chance for deviation from a local optimum. The mutation function output is a child, which is permutation like its parents. The modeling process description is given bellow:
and their LUTs respectively be: If so, a new element is repeatedly randomly generated, and if it is not met yet, it replaces the duplicate. The procedure is applied for both of the children. At the end, they are completely modeled, i.e. permutations. 3. The fitness function, denoted by f itness(Ch), has as an input argument any child, which has already been modeled, and returns a value playing the role of a measure taken to ascertain whether the child will survive to the new generation or not. The fitness value is nothing else but the nonlinearity value of the child N Ch . The fitness test is passed by the child Ch, if N Ch ≥ N thr , where N thr is the threshold nonlinearity value, chosen in advance. If N Ch > N thr , then the child takes its place in the offspring pool. If N Ch = N thr , then besides the child takes its place in the offspring pool, it is also saved in a file. If N Ch > N inv , where N inv is the respective nonlinearity value of S-boxes, based on inversion in the finite field G F(2 n ), then the child is saved in a file. Otherwise, the child does not survive to the next generation and is left off. If after the breeding of all pairs from the parent pool the offspring pool is not totally full, the breeding process starts all over again with the pair (P 1 , P 2 ). This makes sense, because the crossover points CoP 1 and CoP 2 are randomly chosen, which ensures that the next pair of children of P 1 and P 2 will be different from the previous one. When the offspring 
Genetic Algorithm 2
The Genetic algorithm 2 (GA2) is a modification of GA1 in which an additional cost function is applied together with the fitness function in order to help deciding whether the respective child will survive to the next generation or not. The cost function is based on the WHT spectrum and is taken from the family of functions in [9] :
where X and R are real-valued parameters and , as proposed in [34] .
Besides the different selection techniques that are used in GA1 and GA2 to form the new generation, in GA2 there is one more argument added to the arguments of the breeding function. The additional argument, denoted by cnt, is a five-valued counter specifying the order (straight or reversed) in which the two parts of parents genes, divided by the crossover point, are copied into the children. Using the counter helps inserting an additional element of randomness into the computational process by changing the direction of convergence, which in turn enables the genetic process to deviate away from a point of local optimum. The breeding function, denoted by breeding(P i , P j , CoP 1 , CoP 2 , cnt), outputs the pair of children (Ch 1 , Ch 2 ). Depending on the five counter's values, the children have the form: cnt = 1 :
, where x k ∈ B and k = 1, 2, . . . , CoP 1 ;
, where x p ∈ B and p = 1, 2, . . . , CoP 2 ; and
, where x p ∈ B and p = CoP 2 + 1, CoP 2 + 2, . . . , 2 n . cnt = 2 :
, where x p ∈ B and p = CoP 2 + 1, CoP 2 + 2, . . . , 2 n . cnt = 3 :
, where x k ∈ B and k = 1, 2, . . . , CoP 1 ; 
, where x p ∈ B and p = CoP 2 + 1, CoP 2 + 2, . . . , 2 n . cnt = 5 :
, where x p ∈ B and p = CoP 2 + 1,
The main difference between the two genetic algorithms proposed is that in addition to GA1 in GA2 a child, which has already been modeled, passes the fitness test not only in the case when its fitness value is good enough, i.e. N Ch ≥ N thr , but also when in addition its cost value is smaller than the one of its parent, i.e. cost (Ch 1 ) < cost (P 1 ).
Genetic Algorithm 3
The genetic algorithm 3 (GA3) is a modification of GA2. It is also based on a selection technique, relying on both functions, fitness and cost, but it differs from GA2 in the number of fitness functions used and the measured cryptographic characteristics by them. While in GA1 and GA2 the only fitness function measures the nonlinearity of the S-box, in GA3 there are two fitness functions used, measuring the S-box nonlinearity and differential uniformity. The cost function is the same like the one used in GA2. The new generation is formed only by those individuals which have passed the fitness test, that is, which fitness values for nonlinearity are equal to or greater than the chosen in advance threshold nonlinearity value N thr , which fitness values for differential uniformity are equal to or smaller than the chosen in advance threshold differential uniformity value δ thr , and which costs are smaller than the cost of their parents.
The breeding and mutation function -breeding(P i , P j , CoP 1 , CoP 2 , cnt) and modeling(Ch), as well as the crossover scheme used in GA3, are exactly the same like the ones, used in GA2. The only difference between GA2 and GA3 appears in the fitness step. While GA2 uses only one fitness function in the fitness step, f itness(Ch), GA3 makes use of two distinct functions -f itness N (Ch) and f itness δ(Ch) respectively. The functions, f itness N (Ch) in GA3, and f itness(Ch) in GA2, in fact are the same function, which calculates the nonlinearity of the child S-box Ch, N Ch . The function f itness δ(Ch) calculates the differential uniformity of the child S-box Ch, δ Ch . The pseudo-codes of all three algorithms are presented in Appendix A.
Experimental Results
In this section the results of generating a set of T (n × n) bijective S-boxes using the three variants of genetic algorithms are provided.
Results Obtained with GA1

1) The case n = 8
The results obtained by GA1 are closely related to the linear redundancy property. If it is considered as a vital one, the output of the GA1 are S-boxes which possess zero linear redundancy, but their nonlinearities are at most 108. Otherwise, S-boxes with nonlinearity 110 and 112 are achieved, but they possess some linear redundancy. The properties of the representatives obtained with GA1 for the case n = 8 with an initial pool of 200 S-boxes and N thr equal to 104, 106 and 108 are provided in Table 4 .
The properties of the representatives obtained with GA1 for the case n = 8 with an initial pool of 200 S-boxes and N thr equal to 104, 106 and 108 are provided in Table 4 .
The respective cryptographic properties distributions of the S-box component Boolean functions are provided in Table 5 , where the pair (value 1 , value 2 ) means that the respective cryptographic value 1 has occurred exactly a value 2 number of times among all 255 nontrivial S-box component Boolean functions.
As it can be seen from Tables 4 and 5 , the obtained S-boxes possess zero linear redundancy, that is all non-trivial 255 component Boolean functions belong to distinct extended affine equivalence classes. This is an improvement in terms of linear redundancy compared to the inversion-based S-boxes where all 255 component Boolean functions are from the same extended affine equivalence class (Table 2 ) and hence a complete linear redundancy is available. The particular S-boxes are presented in Appendix B in hexadecimal notation.
2) The case n = 16
The properties of the (16 × 16) bijective S-box representatives, obtained with GA1 using an initial pool of 50 finite field inversion-based S-boxes and derivatives, as well as three different values for the threshold nonlinearity N thr , are provided in Table 6 .
Results Obtained with GA2
GA2 is slightly slower than GA1. Furthermore, it should be noted that its results are better only in terms of linear redundancy. S-boxes with nonlinearity 110 and zero linear redundancy were obtained. One reason could be the additional cost function in the fitness which makes the process of obtaining offspring slower and thus inserts more randomness in the process. The other one could be that in all tests with GA2, different paths have been selected because of the randomness inserted in the breeding and in the mutation step. The properties of representatives obtained with GA2 for n = 8 with an initial pool of 200 Sboxes and N thr equal to 106, 110 and 112 are provided in Table 7 . The distributions of the S-box component functions are provided in Table 8 . Similar to GA1, the improvement in terms of zero linear redundancy can also be observed, excluding the case N trh = 112, where only 147 out of 255 distinct extended affine equivalence classes have been achieved. The particular S-boxes can be viewed in Appendix C.
Results obtained with GA3
As it can be expected, the genetic algorithm GA3 is slower than both of its predecessors due to the added second fitness function. Despite the lower speed, GA3 is able to produce large sets of S-boxes, possessing zero linear redundancy, and improved upper and lower bound for nonlinearity and differential uniformity, respectively, at the same time.
1) The case n = 8
Considering the case of (8 × 8) bijective S-boxes, GA3 is able rapidly -quantify somehow or remove to produce many S-boxes, having values for nonlinearity up to 110, differential uniformity -down to 4, and possessing zero linear redundancy at the same time. In case the threshold values N thr and δ thr for nonlinearity and differential uniformity, respectively, are chosen to be 112 and 4, the only S-boxes that GA3 succeeds to find are those based on inversion in the finite field. In case the threshold values N thr and δ thr are chosen to be 112 and 6, GA3 succeeds in producing large sets of S-boxes having nonlinearity 112, differential uniformity 6, but still possessing some linear redundancy. The most usual distribution of the S-box component Boolean functions among distinct extended affine equivalence classes again is in the range from 147 to 155 out of 255 classes possible, similarly to the case with GA1 and GA2. The properties of (8 × 8) bijective S-box representatives, obtained with GA3 using an initial pool of 200 finite field inversion-based S-boxes and derivatives, N thr equal to 104, 106, 108, 110 and 112, and δ thr equal to 4 and 6, are provided in Table 9 . We should note that none of the three algorithms found any S-box satisfying N Ch > N inv . The distributions of S-box component Boolean functions are provided in Table 10 , while the particular S-boxes can be viewed in the Appendix D.
Conclusion
The proposed new method is fast enough in repeatedly producing thousands of (8 × 8) S-boxes having nonlinearities up to 112. For example, between 4000-5000 in 2 days for each nonlinearity threshold value. Due to the reverse way of working, the speed of the method increases as the nonlinearity threshold value is raised. Together with the high values of nonlinearity, most of the S-boxes generated appear to possess cryptographic properties which are close to the optimal values of the finite filed inversion. At a reasonable price of small deviations from the best known values, a more complex algebraic structure and a zero linear redundancy are achieved, except for N thr = N inv where some redundancy is still available. For example, in the case of (8 × 8) bijective S-boxes, the maximum number of different extended affine equivalence classes for the S-box component Boolean functions found was 147 for GA1 and GA2, and 155 for GA3 respectively. Even for n = 16 the algorithm can produce results in a reasonable time, for example if N thr is chosen to be close to N inv = 32512. It has found 50 S-boxes in 3 and a half months. We can obtain S-boxes of each possible nonlinearity and the closer we are to the optimal nonlinearity the faster the algorithm works. This is already considerable improvement comparing to the other methods for (16 × 16) S-boxes.
We do not consider the algebraic immunity as a criterion, hence the S-boxes obtained with our method can not be directly compared with the S-boxes produced by the modified gradient descent method. When the differential uniformity is considered, we are not aware of many other generation methods, which are able to produce S-boxes that are even close to the ones based on finite field inversion with respect to their cryptographic properties. The construction method provided in [28] is also able to produce 4-uniform bijective S-boxes, but their maximal value for nonlinearity is reported to be 98, while higher nonlinearities are not reported and random search is recommended for finding them. The only method, which is able to produce bijective S-boxes with properties that are similar to these produced by our method, is the one reported in [36] . The authors state that there are 32385 (8 × 8) S-boxes with nonlinearity 110, among which 9180 are 4-uniform. We have investigated all of them and we have found that the S-boxes in this set belong to 128 affine equivalent classes of S-boxes. Further we have checked all of them with respect to the rest of the target criteria. There are exactly 35 affine equivalent classes of S-boxes with nonlinearity 110, differential uniformity 4, absolute indicator 40 and algebraic degree 6 or 7, but only one with zero linear redundancy. For the S-box from [36] with nonlinearity 112 (in another affine equivalent class), we have computed the rest of its properties and the obtained values are as follows: differential uniformity 6, algebraic degree 7, absolute indicator 32 and some average quantity for linear redundancy -141 out of 255 possible distinct extended affine equivalence classes. All the rest 92 affine equivalent classes of S-boxes have nonlinearity 110, differential uniformity 6, absolute indicator 40, algebraic degree 6 or 7 and some nonzero linear redundancy.
Thus, both methods can be considered as equally effective with respect to the strength of the results they produce in the case when linear redundancy is not considered. The method in [36] produces a limited number of non-equivalent S-boxes while our algorithm provides a larger set with a greater variety due to the way it works ("swapping" larger parts of the S-box). Indeed, [36] can be theoretically faster but already for 2 days work our method generates a larger and better set of solutions. Therefore, for a designer of a cryptographic algorithm both algorithms have relatively similar efficiency (he/she usually generates the Sboxes only once and in advance off-line), while more important for him/her will be to have a choice among a large set of strong S-boxes with a greater variety of the desired properties.
Appendix A
A.1 Genetic Algorithm 1 pseudo code STEP 1 (Initializing step) -defining the algorithm parameters -Define an integer n, representing the dimensions (n × n) of the bijective S-box.
-Define an integer T , representing the number of S-boxes in the parent pool (P P).
-Define an even integer N thr ≤ N inv , representing the nonlinearity threshold value.
-Generate a number of T S-boxes of dimensions (n × n) and put them into the (P P). Some based on the inversion in the finite field G F(2 n ), while the other obtained in result of the application of affine transformations to the outputs of the former. -Create an empty offspring pool (O P) of size T . -Set the parents indexes t and r to be 1. 
A.2 Genetic Algorithm 2 pseudo code
STEP 1 (Initializing step) -defining the algorithm parameters -Define an integer n, representing the dimensions (n × n) of the bijective S-box.
-Generate a number of T S-boxes of dimensions (n × n) and put them into the (P P). Some based on the inversion in the finite field G F(2 n ), while the other obtained in result of the application of affine transformations to the outputs of the former. -Create an empty offspring pool (O P) of size T . -Set the counter cnt value to be 0. -Set the parents indexes t and r to be 1. A.3 Genetic Algorithm 3 pseudo code STEP 1 (Initializing step) -defining the algorithm parameters -Define an integer n, representing the dimensions (n × n) of the bijective S-box.
-Define an even integer δ thr ≥ δ inv representing the δ-uniformity threshold value.
-Generate a number of T S-boxes of dimensions (n × n) and put them into the (P P).
Some based on the inversion in the finite field G F(2 n ), while the other obtained in result of the application of affine transformations to the outputs of the former. -Create an empty offspring pool (O P) of size T .
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B.2 S-box
0x B E 0x31 0x53 0x92 0x23 0x A3 0x E8 0x27 0x B0 0x A8 0xCC 0x0C 0x0F 0x E A 0x72 0x AA 0x A0 0x7E 0x AE 0x1E 0xC8 0x2C 0x83 0x20 0xC4 0x2D 0x B A 0x41 0x D A 0x0D 0x EC 0x BC 0x88 0x77 0x54 0x2F 0x07 0x47 0x B5 0x28 0x32 0x68 0x F B 0x F A 0x5B 0x6E 0x02 0x1C 0x3B 0x9B 0x48 0x25 0x90 0x AD 0x70 0x1A 0x D6 0x26 0x DD 0x0E 0xC E 0x B D 0x16 0x15 0x E4 0x AC 0x D3 0x52 0x04 0x80 0x8F 0x3C 0x9D 0x6C 0x3A 0x E1 0x6D 0x98 0x74 0x B8 0x95 0x05 0x21 0xC6 0x35 0x4C 0x08 0x61 0x F0 0x76 0x3F 0x79 0x44 0x4F 0x3D 0x96 0x D8 0x A9 0x39 0x5C 0x29 0x F6 0x12 0x A6 0x9F 0x75 0xC A 0x40 0xC F 0x E D 0x D0 0x30 0xC0 0x7F 0x22 0x D5 0x63 0x6B 0x B7 0x13 0xC2 0x DF 0x E5 0x73 0x B1 0x91 0x1F 0x D9} {0x97 0x96 0x1A 0x26 0x1B 0x82 0x AB 0x01 0x38 0x9F 0x F9 0x10 0x60 0x31 0x35 0x17 0x A4 0x64 0x7A 0x9B 0x49 0x F B 0x B0 0x8F 0x88 0x E F 0x2D 0x1C 0x2F 0x90 0x3E 0x62 0x E A 0x B E 0x8A 0x21 0x85 0x9D 0x78 0x19 0x11 0x D A 0x48 0xC5 0x E0 0x94 0x72 0x12
B.3 S-box
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C.2 S-box
0x DC 0xC5 0x90 0x F2 0x55 0x D0 0x49 0x B D 0x A3 0x10 0x98 0x F3 0x E F 0x60 0x6A 0x24 0x40 0x F5 0x A1 0x2F 0x61 0x96 0x71 0x AB 0x38 0x82 0x64 0x1B 0x A5 0x D7 0xC3 0x8F 0x14 0x3A 0x6C 0x34 0x4A 0x D A 0x45 0x02 0x99 0x91 0x05 0x26 0xC D 0xC B 0x41 0x E B 0xCC 0x F7 0x AC 0x50 0x79 0x1C 0xC A 0x F6 0x8E 0x E4 0x00 0x5B 0x08 0x68 0x DD 0x9B 0x F F 0x4B 0x89 0x28 0x A8 0x76 0x9A 0xC4 0x1E 0x4C 0x9F 0x54 0x A4 0x E7 0x70 0x E D} C.3 S-box No 3 (N S = 112, deg(S) = 7, AC(S) max = 32, δ = 6) {0x1E 0x2B 0x D9 0x88 0x A0 0x E9 0x7B 0x B3 0x6F 0x5D 0x B8 0x72 0x F1 0x04 0x95 0x6B 0x F B 0x15 0x E2 0x83 0x63 0x19 0x06 0x30 0x B4 0x B A 0x3D 0x07 0x86 0x B F 0x F9 0x6D 0x B1 0x17 0xC6 0x69 0x4E 0x B7 0x8D 0x59 0x F D 0x44 0xC0 0x5A 0x3C 0x31 0x27 0x F0 0x65 0x E1 0x62 0x3F 0x D2 0x4D 0xC F 0x78 0x7C 0x81 0x93 0x A2 0x B0 0x0B 0x F A 0x3B 0x94 0x25 0xC7 0x09 0x5C 0x22 0x F8 0x35 0x18 0x3E 0x97 0x E E 0x8A 0x52 0x E0 0x1A 0x B2 0x2C 0x1D 0xC E 0x5F 0x84 0x12 0x80 0x21 0x B9 0x D4 0x EC 0x DF 0x A9 0x47 0x AA 0x F E 0x DB 0x BC 0x9C 0x0E 0x B6 0x D3 0x1F 0x56 0x A6 0x E A 0x F4 0x AB 0x74 0x03 0x FC 0x01 0xC1 0x8C 0x0D 0x85 0x7E 0x6E 0x23 0x67 0x8B 0xC9 0x AD 0x42 0x A7 0x D1 0x9E 0x75 0x46 0x DE 0x77 0x AF 0x AE 0xC8 0x51 0x11 0x92 0x2E 0x E8 0x43 0x57 0x D6 0x E6 0x33 0x B5 0x20 0x73 0x87 0x37 0x48 0x9D 0x7A 0x2D 0x16 0x0A 0x4F 0x0F 0x32 0x B B 0x66 0x53 0x29 0x D8 0xC2 0x E5 0x58 0x0C 0x E3 0x39 0x7D 0x13 0x36 0x B E 0x7F 0x5E
0x DC 0xC5 0x90 0x F2 0x55 0x D0 0x49 0x B D 0x A3 0x10 0x98 0x F3 0x E F 0x60 0x6A 0x24 0x40 0x F5 0x A1 0x2F 0x61 0x96 0x71 0x D5 0x38 0x82 0x64 0x1B 0x A5 0x D7 0xC3 0x8F 0x14 0x3A 0x6C 0x34 0x4A 0x D A 0x45 0x02 0x99 0x91 0x05 0x26 0xC D 0xC B 0x41 0x E B 0xCC 0x F7 0x AC 0x50 0x79 0x1C 0xC A 0x F6 0x8E 0x E4 0x00 0x5B 0x08 0x68 0x DD 0x9B 0x F F 0x4B 0x89 0x28 0x A8 0x76 0x9A 0xC4 0x2A 0x4C 0x9F 0x54 0x A4 0x E7 0x70 0x E D} Appendix D: S-boxes generated with GA3 D.1 S-box No 1: N S = 104, deg(S) = 6, AC(S) max = 56, δ = 6 {0x90 0x A5 0x57 0x06 0x2E 0x67 0x F50x3D 0x E1 0x D3 0x36 0x FC 0x7F 0x8A 0x1B 0x E5 0x75 0x9B 0x6C0x0D 0x E D 0x97 0x88 0x B E 0x3A 0x34 0x B3 0x89 0x08 0x31 0x77 0x E3 0x3F 0x99 0x48 0x E7 0xC0 0x39 0x03 0x D7 0x73 0xC A 0x4E 0x D4 0x B2 0x B F 0x A9 0x7E 0x E B 0x6F 0x EC 0x B1 0x5C 0xC3 0x41 0x F6 0x F2 0x0F 0x1D 0x2C 0x3E 0x85 0x74 0x5A 0x1A 0x AB 0x49 0x87 0x D2 0x AC 0x76 0x B B 0x96 0x B0 0x19 0x60 0x04 0x DC 0x6E 0x94 0x3C 0x A2 0x93 0x40 0x D1 0x0A 0x9C 0x0E 0x AF 0x37 0x11 0x62 0x51 0x27 0xC9 0x24 0x70 0x55 0x32 0x12 0x80 0x38 0x5D 0x91 0x D8 0x28 0x64 0x7A 0x25 0x F A 0x8D 0x72 0x8F 0x4F 0x02 0x83 0x0B 0x F0 0x E0 0x AD 0x E9 0x05 0x47 0x23 0xCC 0x29 0x5F 0x10 0x F B 0xC8 0x50 0x F9 0x21 0x20 0x46 0x DF 0x9F 0x1C 0x A0 0x66 0xC D 0x D9 0x58 0x68 0x B D 0x3B 0x AE 0x F D 0x09 0x B9 0xC6 0x13 0x F4 0x A3 0x98 0x84 0xC1 0x81 0x BC 0x35 0x E8 0x DD 0x A7 0x56 0x4C 0x6B 0x D6 0x82 0x6D 0x B7 0x F3 0x9D 0x B8 0x30 0x F1 0x D0 0x52 0x4B 0x1E 0x7C 0x DB 0x5E 0xC7 0x33 0x2D 0x9E 0x16 0x7D 0x61 0x E E 0x E4 0x AA 0xC E 0x7B 0x2F 0x A1 0x E F 0x18 0x F F 0x5B 0x B6 0x0C 0x E A 0x95 0x2B 0x59 0x4D 0x01 0x9A 0x B4 0x E2 0x B A 0xC4 0x54 0xC B 0x8C 0x17 0x1F 0x8B 0x A8 0x43 0x45 0xC F 0x65 0x42 0x79 0x22 0x DE 0x F7 0x92 0x44 0x78 0x00 0x6A 0x8E 0x D5 0x86 0x E6 0x53 0x15 0x71 0xC5 0x07 0x A6 0x26 0x F8 0x14 0x4A 0x B5 0x A4 0x2A 0x69 0x D A 0xC2 0x63 0x F E} {0xC1 0xC0 0x AA 0x63 0x4B 0x02 0x90 0x58 0x84 0x B6 0x53 0x99 0x1A 0x E F 0x7E 0x80 0x10 0x F E 0x09 0x68 0x88 0x F2 0x E D 0x DB 0x5F 0x51 0x D6 0x EC 0x6D 0x54 0x12 0x86 0x2D 0x FC 0x5A 0x82 0x A5 0x5C 0x66 0x B2 0x16 0x AF 0x2B 0x B1 0x D7 0x D A 0xCC 0x1B 0x8E 0x0A 0x89 0x D4 0x39 0x A6 0x24 0x93 0x97 0x6A 0x78 0x49 0x5B 0x E0 0x11 0x D0 0x7F 0xC E 0x2C 0x E2 0x B7 0xC9 0x13 0x DE 0x F3 0x D5 0x7C 0x05 0x61 0x B9 0x0B 0x F1 0x59 0xC7 0x F6 0x25 0x F9 0x6F 0x B4 0x6B 0xC A 0x52 0x3F 0x07 0x34 0x42 0x AC 0x41 0x15 0x30 0x57 0x77 0x E5 0x5D 0x38 0x F4 0x B D 0x4D 0x01 0x1F 0x40 0x9F 0x E8 0x17 0x E A 0x2A 0x67 0x E6 0x6E 0x95 0x85 0xC8 0x8C 0x60 0x22 0x46 0x A9 0x4C 0x3A 0x75 0x9E 0x AD 0x35 0x9C 0x44 0x45 0x23 0x B A 0x F A 0x79 0xC5 0x03 0x A8 0x BC 0x3D 0x0D 0x D8 0x5E 0xC B 0x98 0x6C 0x DC 0x A3 0x76 0x91 0xC6 0x F D 0x E1 0x A4 0x E4 0x D9 0x50 0x8D 0x B8 0xC2 0x33 0x29 0x0E 0x B3 0x E7 0x08 0x D2 0x96 0x F8 0x DD 0x55 0x94 0x B5 0x37 0x2E 0x7B 0x19 0x B E 0x3B 0x A2 0x56 0x48 0x F B 0x73 0x18 0x04 0x8B 0x81 0xC F 0x AB 0x1E 0x4A 0xC4 0x8A 0x7D 0x9A 0x3E 0x D3 0x69 0x8F 0x F0 0x4E 0x3C 0x28 0x64 0x F F 0x D1 0x87 0x DF 0x A1 0x31 0x AE 0x E9 0x72 0x7A 0x E E 0xC D 0x26 0x20 0x32 0x00 0x27 0x1C 0x47 0x B B 0x92 0x F7 0x21 0x1D 0x65 0x0F 0x E B 0x B0 0x E3 0x83 0x36 0x70 0x14 0x A0 0x62 0xC3 0x43 0x9D 0x71 0x2F 0x F5 0x A7 0x74 0x B F 0x4F 0x0C 0x9B 0x06} D.3 S-box No 3: N S = 108, deg(S) = 7, AC(S) max = 48, δ = 4 {0x3B 0x2B 0x90 0xC1 0x E9 0x A0 0x32 0x F A 0x26 0x14 0x F1 0x57 0x B8 0x4D 0x DC 0x22 0x B2 0x5C 0x AB 0xC A 0x2A 0x50 0x4F 0x79 0x F D 0x F3 0x74 0x4E 0xC F 0x F6 0x B0 0x24 0x F8 0x5E 0x8F 0x20 0x07 0x F E 0xC4 0x10 0x B4 0x0D 0x89 0x13 0x75 0x78 0x6E 0x B9 0x2C 0x A8 0x62 0x76 0x9B 0x04 0x86 0x31 0x35 0xC8 0x D A 0x E B 0x F9 0x42 0x B3 0x72 0x DD 0x6C 0x8E 0x40 0x15 0x6B 0x B1 0x7C 0x51 0x77 0x DE 0x A7 0xC3 0x1B 0x A9 0x53 0x F B 0x65 0x54 0x87 0x16 0xC D 0x5B 0xC9 0x68 0x F0 0x9D 0x A5 0x96 0x E0 0x0E 0x E3 0x B7 0x92 0x F5 0x D5 0x47 0x F F 0x9A 0x56 0x1F 0x E F 0x A3 0x B D 0x E2 0x3D 0x4A 0x B5 0x48 0x88 0xC5 0x44 0xCC 0x37 0x27 0x6A 0x2E 0xC2 0x80 0x E4 0x0B 0x E E 0x98 0x D7 0x3C 0x0F 0x97 0x3E 0x E6 0x E7 0x81 0x18 0x58 0x DB 0x67 0x A1 0x0A 0x1E 0x9F 0x AF 0x7A 0x FC 0x69 0x3A 0xC E 0x7E 0x01 0x D4 0x33 0x64 0x5F 0x43 0x06 0x46 0x7B 0x F2 0x2F 0x1A 0x60 0x91 0x8B 0x AC 0x11 0x45 0x AA 0x70 0x34 0x5A 0x7F 0x F7 0x36 0x17 0x95 0x8C 0x D9 0x B B 0x1C 0x99 0x00 0x F4 0x E A 0x59 0x D1 0x B A 0x A6 0x29 0x23 0x6D 0x09 0x BC 0x E8 0x66 0x28 0x DF 0x38 0x9C 0x71 0xC B 0x2D 0x52 0x EC 0x9E 0x8A 0xC6 0x5D 0x73 0x25 0x7D 0x03 0x93 0x0C 0x4B 0x D0 0x D8 0x4C 0x6F 0x84 0x82 0x08 0x A2 0x85 0x B E 0x E5 0x19 0x30 0x55 0x83 0x B F 0xC7 0x AD 0x49 0x12 0x41 0x21 0x94 0x D2 0x B6 0x02 0xC0 0x61 0x E1 0x3F 0x D3 0x8D 0x63 0x05 0x D6 0x1D 0x E D 0x AE 0x39 0x A4} {0x5C 0xC0 0x32 0x63 0x4B 0x02 0x90 0x58 0x84 0x B6 0x53 0x99 0x1A 0x E F 0x7E 0x80 0x10 0x F E 0x09 0x68 0x88 0x F2 0x E D 0x DB 0x5F 0x51 0x D6 0x EC 0x6D 0x54 0x12 0x86 0x5A 0x FC 0x2D 0x82 0x A5 0x B D 0x66 0x B2 0x16 0x AF 0x2B 0x B1 0x D7 0x D A 0xCC 0x1B 0x8E 0x0A 0x89 0x D4 0x39 0x A6 0x24 0x93 0x97 0x6A 0x78 0x49 0x5B 0x E0 0x11 0x D0 0x7F 0xC E 0x2C 0x E2 0x B7 0xC9 0x13 0x DE 0x F3 0x D5 0x7C 0x05 0x61 0x B9 0x0B 0x F1 0x59 0xC7 0xC1 0x25 0x B4 0x6F 0x F9 0x6B 0xC A 0x52 0x3F 0x07 0x34 0x42 0x AC 0x41 0x15 0x30 0x57 0x77 0x E5 0x5D 0x38 0x F4 0x F6 0x4D 0x01 0x1F 0x40 0x9F 0x E8 0x17 0x E A 0x2A 0x67 0x E6 0x6E 0x95 0x85 0xC8 0x8C 0x60 0x22 0x46 0x A9 0x4C 0x3A 0x75 0x9E 0x AD 0x35 0x9C 0x44 0x45 0x23 0x B A 0x F A 0x79 0xC5 0x03 0x A8 0x BC 0x3D 0x0D 0x D8 0x5E 0xC B 0x98 0x6C 0x DC 0x A3 0x76 0x91 0xC6 0x F D 0x E1 0x A4 0x E4 0x D9 0x50 0x8D 0x B8 0xC2 0x33 0x29 0x0E 0x B3 0x E7 0x08 0x D2 0x96 0x F8 0x DD 0x55 0x94 0x B5 0x37 0x2E 0x7B 0x19 0x B E 0x3B 0x A2 0x56 0x48 0x F B 0x73 0x18 0x04 0x8B 0x81 0xC F 0x AB 0x1E 0x4A 0xC4 0x8A 0x7D 0x9A 0x3E 0x D3 0x69 0x8F 0x F0 0x4E 0x3C 0x28 0x64 0x F F 0x D1 0x87 0x DF 0x A1 0x31 0x AE 0x E9 0x72 0x7A 0x E E 0xC D 0x26 0x20 0x AA 0x00 0x27 0x1C 0x47 0x B B 0x92 0x F7 0x21 0x1D 0x65 0x0F 0x E B 0x B0 0x E3 0x83 0x36 0x70 0x14 0x A0 0x62 0xC3 0x43 0x9D 0x71 0x2F 0x F5 0x A7 0x74 0x B F 0x4F 0x0C 0x9B 0x06} D.5 S-box No 5: N S = 112, deg(S) = 7, AC(S) max = 32, δ = 6 {0x2F 0xC0 0x32 0x63 0x4B 0x02 0x90 0x58 0x84 0x B6 0x53 0x99 0x1A 0x E F 0x7E 0x80 0x10 0x F E 0x09 0x68 0x88 0x F2 0x E D 0x DB 0x5F 0x51 0x D6 0x EC 0x6D 0x54 0x12 0x86 0x5A 0x FC 0x2D 0x82 0x A5 0x5C 0x66 0x B2 0x16 0x AF 0x2B 0x B1 0x D7 0x D A 0xCC 0x1B 0x8E 0x0A 0x89 0x D4 0x39 0x A6 0x24 0x93 0x97 0x6A 0x78 0x49 0x5B 0x E0 0x11 0x D0
D.2 S-box
D.4 S-box
0x7F 0xC E 0x2C 0x E2 0x B7 0xC9 0x13 0x DE 0x F3 0x D5 0x7C 0x05 0x61 0x B9 0x0B 0x F1 0x59 0xC7 0x F6 0x25 0x B4 0x6F 0x F9 0x6B 0xC A 0x52 0x3F 0x07 0x34 0x42 0x AC 0x41 0x15 0x30 0x57 0x77 0x E5 0x5D 0x38 0x F4 0x B D 0x4D 0x01 0x1F 0x40 0x9F 0x E8 0x17 0x E A 0x2A 0x67 0x E6 0x6E 0x95 0x85 0xC8 0x8C 0x60 0x22 0x46 0x A9 0x4C 0x3A 0x75 0x9E 0x AD 0x35 0x9C 0x44 0x45 0x23 0x B A 0x F A 0x79 0xC5 0x03 0x A8 0x BC 0x3D 0x0D 0x D8 0x5E 0xC B 0x98 0x6C 0x DC 0x A3 0x76 0x91 0xC6 0x F D 0x E1 0x A4 0x E4 0x D9 0x50 0x8D 0x B8 0xC2 0x33 0x29 0x0E 0x B3 0x E7 0x08 0x D2 0x96 0x F8 0x DD 0x55 0x94 0x B5 0x37 0x2E 0x7B 0x19 0x B E 0x3B 0x A2 0x56 0x48 0x F B 0x73 0x18 0x04 0x8B 0x81 0xC F 0x AB 0x1E 0x4A 0xC4 0x8A 0x7D 0x9A 0x3E 0x D3 0x69 0x8F 0x F0 0x4E 0x3C 0x28 0x64 0x F F 0x D1 0x87 0x DF 0x A1 0x31 0x AE 0x E9 0x72 0x7A 0x E E 0xC D 0x26 0x20 0x AA 0x00 0x27 0x1C 0x47 0x B B 0x92 0x F7 0x21 0x1D 0x65 0x0F 0x E B 0x B0 0x E3 0x83 0x36 0x70 0x14 0x A0 0x62 0xC3 0x43 0x9D 0x71 0xC1 0x F5 0x A7 0x74 0x B F 0x4F 0x0C 0x9B 0x06}
